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Be aware with a Honeypot
Stephen Meyer, Ivan Smyth,
Mark Cummins and Anthony Keane
Institute of Technology Blanchardstown, Dublin 15, Ireland
Abstract
The Internet has already become a hostile environment for computers, especially when
they are directly connected with a public IP address. We have experienced this hostile
activity where on an average day; the ITB Honeypot recorded over a thousand
reconnaissance attacks seeking unauthorised entry onto our private network. Our
Honeypot is a basic PC running Windows XP with no services offered and no activity
from users that would generate traffic. The Honeypot is running in a passive state on a
stub-network where all inbound and outbound traffic is recorded at the bridging
computer to the WAN. We report on the majority of scans and vulnerability attacks
that were used and investigate the processes that targeted vulnerable ports and access
points on the network.
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Introduction
It is generally accepted that the average time for an unprotected computer to be
compromised on the Internet now less than two hours. Here we investigate this claim
by recording uninvited network activity implemented against our computers that are
connected directly to the Internet and constitute our Honeynet [1]. As a Honeynet is an
unadvertised network and does not run applications that initiate Internet traffic, then all
traffic on a Honeynet is considered malicious and goes through a data control firewall
that tracks inbound and outbound connections and an intrusion protection system (IPS)
to prevent any compromised Honeypots from being used to initiate attacks by dropping
or modifying malicious traffic originating from them.
Vulnerabilities in Networks
In general, computer networks are composed of devices, applications and protocols.
The typical devices are switches, routers, servers and client computers. The
applications are network and client operation systems, web and email services and
many other application services that vary depending on the business using the network.
The communications between devices and applications use standard well known
protocols [2], many of which have little or no security ability built-in to them.
Individually and together, these component parts of the network provide a wide ranging
array of weak points (vulnerabilities) that hackers probe and attack in order to gain
access and eventually take over computers on the network [3].
Typical points of attack in a network are:
1. Poor configuration of router access controls lists that allow leakage through ICMP,
IP, NetBIOS and can lead to unauthorised access to DMZ servers
2. Poorly secured remote access points
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3. Excessive trust relationships in a Domain provide hackers with unauthorised access
to sensitive information
4. User or test accounts with weak passwords and excessive privileges
5. Unpatched, outdated software, default configurations
6. Lack of accepted and well defined security policies, procedures and guidelines
7. File and directory access controls
8. Unauthorised services and programs on hosts
9. Weak passwords on workstations
10. Misconfigured Internet server applications and services
11. Misconfigured or poorly updated firewall
12. Running unnecessary services like NetBIOS can compromise network
13. Information leakage can provide attacker with OS type, versions, zone transfers,
running services, etc.
14. Inadequate monitoring and detection capabilities at all levels
These are illustrated in figure 1, which shows a typical configuration of a network.
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Figure 1: Typical topology of a network with possible weaknesses indicated by
numbers.
The steps used to exploit a system follow the general methodology of first conducting
an Active Reconnaissance of the network with the aim of gaining access by attacking
the operating system or conducting an application level attack, scripts attack or
targeting default or misconfigurations on the network. Once inside the attacker will try
to elevate the privileges of the account to allow them to install a backdoor program that
will allow future access. Finally they will cover their tracks in the system by cleaning
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up log files to remove evidence of their presence. If an attacker fails to gain access to
the system, they may initiate a Denial of Service attack to prevent anyone accessing the
system at all.
Why we need to protect the Network
Networks are pathways to computers and people use computers to store stuff like
personal identity, bank, credit card details and purchases made on the Internet.
Computers store information ubiquitously on people and companies operate their
businesses with and on computers. Two recent reports have highlighted concerns with
the way information is treated on computers and the new threats to businesses.
Researchers at RITS Information Security performed a study in how the Irish
population dispose of their computers [4] and during this study analysed the contents of
recycled hard disks bought openly on the market. The RITS survey found the
following:
Organisation Identifiable: In the sample, 33% of the disks originated from the
corporate sector ranging from large financial institutions, marketing consultancies,
auctioneers, utility organizations, legal solicitors and mobile communication
companies. Information included customer’s names and addresses, invoices, financial
records of past jobs, emails, organisation charts and other relevant documents relating
to the organisation.
Personal Information: 62% of the disks were identified as personal computers or home
user computers and from half of these could identify their previous owner. This
included names, addresses, phone numbers, date of birth and in some cases even bank
records and PPS numbers. 10% of the disks contained PPS numbers.
Financial: 24% of the disks contained credit card information. Alarmingly one of these
disks contained a spreadsheet of at least 300 credit card details along with expiry
numbers, names and addresses.
Passwords: 48% of the disks contained passwords. These ranged from passwords to
online sites, email sites, mobile phone sites, etc. These passwords were easily retrieved.
No brute forcing of passwords took place.
Illegal Material: 57% of the hard disks contained illegal material.
In the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 2007 [5] they make the following
statements: “The current threat environment is characterised by an increase in data
theft and data leakage and the creation of malicious code that targets specific
organisations for information that can be used for financial gain” and that “Attackers
are now refining their methods and consolidating their assets to create global networks
that support coordinated criminal activity”
This heightened activity in criminal behavior on the Internet is fuelled by the ability to
purchase web vulnerability kits and customize them for your exploits.
Be Skeptical: if it is too good to be true, then it usually is
Web vulnerability kits [6] allow an attacker to gain control over client computers when
they innocently access web sites hosting the malicious web exploitation kits. The web
servers are usually offering free software or games and more often than not, appear to
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be too good to be true offers. The web server will return malicious malcode as part of
the innocent response expected by the client. The newly downloaded malcode will
begin a process of installing itself and may access other malicious servers to get more
malcode. Now the attacker is in complete control of the client machine and is able to
steal personal information from the client and may add the client to a botnet for
attacking other computers, possibly in a denial of services attack.

Figure 2: Web Vulnerability Kits have infected many popular websites [6]
IDS – This will protect us, surely?
Intrusion detection systems and firewalls are essentially a detection technology to keep
attacks out of your network. They Detect and Alert when there are unauthorised access
and malicious activities detected in a network. The problems with IDS systems is that
it relies on a signature of an attack before the attack can be detected so this can lead to
false positives and false negatives, a situation where network traffic is mistakenly
blocked or permitted. Also IDS system relies on being able to examine packet headers
and payloads in the network traffic, but if encryption is used then it can not be read.
Also hackers are constantly using new sophisticated evasion techniques to evade the
network security systems.
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Honeynets Overview
Motivation
The primary motivation to set up and run a Honeynet is to gather data from attacks and
to try and understand the attacks. The main issues are what tools are used, how are they
used, by whom and why. What are the tactics and motives of the hackers?
Honeynet Types
There are basically four types of Honeynet deployments; the high interaction Honeynet
uses a real network of computers covering a wide variety of operating systems and
architectures. The low interaction Honeynets focus on a particular issue like a service
attack while virtual Honeynets use a virtual network of computers to simulate a real
network. Finally distributed Honeynets are an amalgamation of several Honeynets
geographically dispersed to study global attacks.
History of Honeynet Project
The Honeynet Project [7] began in 1999 by several security geeks (as they describe
themselves) to investigate the activities of the “bad guys”. Their goals were to learn
about tools and techniques and develop new monitoring and counter-attack tools. So
much data was gathered that they found it difficult to find time to analyse it all so they
created the “Scan of the Month challenge” and offered the data openly for anyone to
have a go at investigating it. This was so successful that they also created the “Reverse
Challenge” competition which requires competitors to reverse engineer binary code to
analyse malicious applications and code. The Honeynet Project has grown into the
Honeynet Research Alliance, a consortium of different academics and professionals
that cooperate worldwide in the goals of the Honeynet project.
Brief history of the Honeynets
The Honeynet Project has further developed tools and methods from generation one
(Gen-I) to the generation two (Gen-II (2002)) versions and freely distributed this
software from their website. The Gen-II tools have significant improvements and
together with the benefits of running a Honeywall as a bridge with filtering intelligence
give the following features: new tools like SNORT-INLINE, Sebek, rc.firewall, Virtual
Honeypots, user interface for management and free bootable CD-ROM images, version
1.1 and mostly recently (June 2007) version 1.2.
The main advances in Honeynets are that as all traffic is suspicious, we have no false
positives or false negatives, allow the collection of small data sets, allow the capture of
encrypted activity, will work with IPv6, is highly flexible and requires minimum
resources to setup and operate.
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Honeynet Architecture

Figure 3: One possible layout of the Honeynet
Honeynet Configuration
Important configuration issues are the mode and IP information for the Honeywall,
which is set to operate in bridged mode with identification as to which interface is
operating as the external and internal bridge interface. The IP address of the Honeynet,
the LAN broadcast address and the LAN CIDR address is also needed.
For remote management of the Honeynet, you need to enter the IP address and subnet
of Honeypots, the Gateway address, Hostname, Domain name and DNS (if available),
the manager IP address and any restriction on inbound / outbound traffic. Finally the
Walleye needs to be activated.
Honeynet Operation
The two essential parts of the Honeywall is data control and data capture. Data Control
is being able to provide containment of activity, to monitor inbound/outbound
connections, have automatic alerting and the ability to block outward bound activity.
Finally all the activities of the Honeywall must be difficult for attackers to detect.
For Data Capture we require monitoring and logging of all activities and data with the
challenge to collect as much data as possible without being detected. The Honeywall is
layered with the firewall provided by IPTables and the IDS storing full binary data
captured of the network traffic using Snort-Inline. When a Honeypot becomes infected,
the attacker’s keystrokes are captured and stored on the Honeywall using Sebek.
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Before implementing a new Honeywall on a live Internet connection, the following
steps should be followed with an offline network to check if Honeywall is working
properly;
1. Check if the IPTables logging mechanism is running correctly. You can use a
production host to open a telnet connection to the Honeypot. Check to see if the
connection recorded. If so, now enable LAN blocking and try connection again.
2. Check if IPTables are limiting outbound connections. Make several HTTP
connections to outside world and check the /var/log/messages file on Honeywall.
There should be entries with limits noted. Try UDP and ICMP protocols as well.
3. Check Snort-Inline. Use the test.rules file and include it in the configuration file
and restart IPS. Now open external telnet session, an HTTP connection and send
pings. Check snort-inline alert file for entries and note the dropping of packets and
check snort in IDS mode (read data with tcpdump). Finally check for email alerts
(if set).
Results from the Honeynet
The ITB Honeynet was setup and configured in June 2007 with Honeypots running
standard Windows XP and 2000 client installations. We have found that the Honeypots
get compromised very easily and often have to be replaced in the Honeynet so further
forensics analysis of the exploit can be made offline.
In this section, we present in detail the data from a typical day of activity on the
Honeynet showing the large quantify of data that gets recorded and to give some idea of
the types of processes used in an attack.
A summary overview from the Walleye of the 24 hour period of activity is presented in
figure 4. It shows the following details:
1. the identity of the Honeywall, date and time of activation and various other
localisation information.
2. the top 10 Honeypots
3. the top 10 remote host connections
4. the top 10 source ports and destination ports
This summary information is taken from the recorded pcap packets recorded on the
bridge between the Honeynet LAN and the Internet. It is a snapshot of the activity on
the Honeynet where no activity should be taking place. The top 10 remote hosts are
represented by IPv4 addresses so we can trace them on the Internet. They are unlikely
to be the real IP addresses of the attacker because he will have used a compromised
computers to do his dirty work for him by activating it remotely and thus avoiding
leaving a trail of evidence to him directly.
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Figure 4: Summary of Honeynet Activity for 24 hours
Taking for example the traffic summary report for the 24 hours from the 2nd December
to the 3rd December 2007 for detailed analysis, we find that 8,008 packets were
processed with a total of 145 IDS events being recorded. The total inbound and
outbound packet count is summarised in table 1.
Connection
Type
Inbound
Outbound

Count
1256
8

Packets
In
1328
16

Packets
Out
0
16

Bytes
In
539359
0

Bytes
Out
0
0

Table 1: Packet Count for 24 hours
The IDS on the Honeywall is configured to limit the number of packets allowed out
from the Honeynet from a compromised Honeypot computer. This prevents the
compromised Honeypots from engaging in attacks on other computers while still
allowing us to examine the attack process in action.
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Remote IP
207.145.74.21
218.10.137.139
24.64.24.51
221.208.208.94
82.71.9.231
221.209.110.50
62.193.242.99
74.86.42.113
87.67.249.225
220.104.255.79

Packets
16
7
6
6
10
5
6
5
4
8

Bytes
0
3199
2904
2742
0
2285
4
0
0
0

Conns
8
7
6
6
5
5
4
4
4
4

Table 2: Top 10 Remote IPs:
The source IP addresses were recorded from the packets and these are summarised in
table 3. We can trace the origin of these IP addresses using whois utility on the
Internet. This shows that China and America are the most frequent sources of attacks.
Remote IP
207.145.74.21
218.10.137.139
24.64.24.51
221.208.208.94
82.71.9.231
221.209.110.50
62.193.242.99
74.86.42.113
87.67.249.225
220.104.255.79

Country
United States of America
China
Canada
China
United Kingdom
China
Netherlands
United States of America
Belgium
Japan

Table 3: Countries of origin
The total number of ports scanned (destination ports) was 27 with details of the top ten
scanned pots given in table 4 while in table 5 we can see the corresponding applications
associated with the ports. Typical attacks are on NetBIOS ports and HTTP ports as
well as ping sweeps and MS-SQL attacks. Table 7 and figure 5 show the complete
range and frequency of activity on each of the ports. UDP ports of 1026, 1027 and
1028 contain the highest quantity of packets/bytes and connections. The port of 1026 is
used by the calendar access protocol and one can suppose that the attacker is trying to
use some exploit in applications that use CAP to gain access to the Honeypot.
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Port
udp/1026
udp/1027
udp/1028
icmp/0
tcp/135
tcp/139
udp/1434
tcp/22
tcp/445
tcp/80

Packets
418
361
340
101
65
29
16
16
16
9

Bytes
196110
174164
164560
4197
9
0
4516
0
0
0

Conns
418
361
340
54
53
14
14
11
8
4

Table 4: Top 10 Scanned Ports:
Count
4
99
2
2
12
12
2
12

SID
2
384
483
525
2003
2004
2049
2050

Alert Description
(spp_stream4) possible EVASIVE RST detection
ICMP PING
ICMP PING CyberKit 2.2 Windows
BAD-TRAFFIC udp port 0 traffic
MS-SQL Worm propagation attempt
MS-SQL Worm propagation attempt OUTBOUND
MS-SQL ping attempt
MS-SQL version overflow attempt
Table 5: All Snort Alerts

Suspicious Connections:
There is some evidence that the Honeypot has been compromised and has launched
attacks on the other computers in the LAN. This is indicated by suspicious activities
taking place on the Honeypot even though no users or application services are using the
Honeypot. Some activity can be identified as belonging to operating system services
that broadcast packets of notification and this can be easily identified and discarded.
Other types of activity will require further forensic analysis. Table 5 lists the serious
activities on the Honeywall that have been detected by the intrusion detection system,
Snort. This list is typical of reconnaissance and footprinting activity performed by
hackers. The MS-SQL activity is also typical of a hacker trying to gain access to the
system where they would try to download Malware or hacking tools to escalate
privileges to account access and take over control of the computer.
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Analysis of data for one week (2nd December to 9th December 2007)
Details of the ports used in the Honeynet attacks.
Port

Packets

Bytes

Connect

0

602

13,425

334

Shirt
Pocket
launchTunes.

21

24

0

13

FTP, File Transfer Protocol, control.

22

90

0

64

SSH.

23

17

0

7

Telnet.

25

27

0

13

SMTP, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol.

32

4

0

2

53

5

0

5

DNS, Domain Name System.

80

28

0

17

HTTP, HyperText Transfer Protocol.

110

6

0

2

POP, Post Office Protocol, version 3.

135

466

15

326

DCE endpoint resolution

137

19

200

6

NETBIOS Name Service.

139

140

0

65

NETBIOS Session Service.

143

3

0

3

IMAP, Interactive Mail Access Protocol.

443

23

0

14

HTTPS, HTTP over SSL/TLS.

445

141

0

85

Microsoft-DS.

1000

6

0

4

cadlock2

1026

2,093

1,095,178

1,264

CAP, Calendar Access Protocol.

1027

2,120

923,663

1,156

ExoSee.

1028

1,965

860,552

1,074

1070

4

0

2

AT+C License Manager.

1080

0

3

0

Millicent Client Proxy.

1433

46

0

25

Microsoft-SQL-Server.

1434

64

13,164

37

Microsoft-SQL-Monitor.

2967

8

0

5

Symantec System Center agent.

3306

4

0

2

MySQL.

3389

0

2

0

MS WBT Server.

4899

5

0

5

RAdmin Port.

5168

7

0

7

SCTE30 Connection.

5900

25

0

13

VNC Server.

6101

2

0

1

SynchroNet-rtc.

8080

16

0

6

HTTP alternate.

8999

4

0

2

Brodos Crypto Trade Protocol.

10000

17

0

15

NDMP, Network Data Management Protocol.

netTunes. Shirt

Table 6: List of ports used for attacking Honeypot
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Figure 5: Plot shows the frequency of activity on each of the port numbers
Conclusions and Future work
We have shown how easy it is to setup a Honeynet using the Honeynet Project image
software and we have collected data that has demonstrated how frequently a computer
is attacked and through the suspicious connections we have shown that the basic
operating system became infected and compromised on the first day of being
connected.
Under Irish law and International law, if your computer is used to attack another
computer and gain unauthorised access, then you are responsible and libel for
prosecution. So it is important that we are aware of the dangers of being connected to
the Internet and how these attacks are conducted and how to safeguard our computers
from being compromised.
When we compare our finding with the experiences of other Honeynets, for example
the HEAnet Honeynet, we see much of the same activity on the detection level. We are
currently working on the forensics analysis of the compromised Honeypots where we
are looking for answers to the questions like the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Is the attack real?
Who is committing the attack?
What is the timeline?
Identify all the malicious traffic involved in the attack for offline analysis
Is there a pattern to the attack?
What commands / tools were used?
Was a rootkit used?
Was an IRC channel used?
What exploits were used?
Was the honeypot comprised and used to initiate attacks?
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We hope to have completed this work in a few months time and will follow up this
paper with the results.
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